Monthly Archives: November 2015

One misuse of the efficient Katja hypothesis

Sometimes I have bad, longstanding problems. Sometimes other people know about them, but probably assume I have done everything I can to solve them, because I’m a reasonable person. So they don’t try to help me to solve them, because the problems are presumably incredibly intractable. They especially don’t try to help me solve them by checking I’ve tried easy things, because that would be rude. Reasonable people don’t go around having terrible problems that are easy to solve. 

Unfortunately, sometimes I do the same thing. I know I have some substantial problem, and since it has been there forever, I assume I’ve tried pretty hard to solve it, because I’m a reasonable person. I don’t explicitly think this, or the argument would look suspicious to me. But if there’s just some terrible thing that is a permanent fixture of my life, presumably that’s because it’s pretty damn hard to fix. 

Sometimes though, past-Katja was assuming something similar. Sometimes a problem has been around forever from the first time a person even notices it. You won’t necessarily notice yourself truly noticing it for the first time, and then rapidly take concrete actions to resolve it. It is already familiar. Or perhaps you have had it since before you were reasonable at all, but at every point you implicitly assumed it was beyond your capabilities, since apparently it was yesterday. 

At any rate, sometimes I end up with longstanding problems that I have never actually tried that hard to solve. And unless I actually stare at them and ask myself what it was I did to try to solve them, I don’t notice. This is similar to the error I labeled ‘I like therefore I am’, in which approving of a virtue is mistaken for having it. Here disapproving of a problem is mistaken for fighting it. I am not sure if this is a pattern for other people. If so, I suggest actually trying to solve it.

Mental minimalism

Hypothesis: 

It is nice to work in other people’s spaces relative to mine, because I am not supposed to interact with their stuff. Having fewer affordances reduces mental noise, in the same way that minimalism does. You can have something like the mental effects of minimalism even in a pigsty, just by firmly refusing to believe that pigs can be interacted with. Objects become scenery.

This suggests that instead of picking up my things, I could just make a solemn promise that I will not pick up my things. I am yet to run the experiments.

If this hypothesis is true, it might have implications beyond optimal tidying schedules. For many things in the world, I wish I felt more affordances. I wish they didn’t feel like wallpaper. Also, the world seems extremely noisy and cluttered. Maybe these things are related. Maybe if you can only cope with so much noise and clutter, then you have to demote affordances, to make the world livable. In that case, maybe there are other ways to increase clutter-tolerance, that would allow more affordances.

Wanting the destination in a journey-based community

In a relationship centered around helping one another improve, there is a risk that after both have improved, one person becomes unable to be helped by the other.

Similarly, in a community centered around helping one another improve, there is a risk of succeeding enough that self-improvement is no longer a dominant concern in one’s life. In fact, hopefully everyone will at some point be sufficiently improved that it is time to get on to the actual project they were improving for. At least on a model where the self-improvement was partly instrumental. Maybe object level work and improvement will be mixed together for a long while. But by the last week of your life, it is unlikely that you should be building much infrastructure for yourself. Yet if self-improvement were no longer a dominant concern, then a self-improvement based community could not help you, and you would be of little interest to the community.

Furthermore, in a community centered around particular styles of growth—such as having deep insights about one’s soul—there is an even more plausible risk that that will cease to be the most effective route to becoming strong, and again you will lose your community if your path of improvement were to take you through a place like that.

Relatedly, in a community where much connection derives from people offering each other a particular kind of help, there is a risk that you will learn to help yourself in that way, severing the flow of other social benefits, unless you are somehow hampered. One kind of help this is particularly likely for is ‘easy help’. If you learn to solve the easy problems, fewer people can help you.

This should all be a disincentive to improving. Or to interpreting your current state as being good enough to be getting on with saving the world, for instance. In the same way as one might be tempted to interpret oneself as weak to be helped by one’s partner, one might be tempted to interpret oneself as hampered by deep and fascinating psychological maladaptations to be able to bond over them with other self-improvement fanatics.

Is this a problem for self-improvement based communities you are familiar with? Are the most popular or interesting people in these communities the ones who get on with object level work in an efficient and psychologically uneventful fashion? Or the people who have breakthroughs and trajectory changes,  and try new things, and find new ways of seeing themselves and others? Do you really look forward to the day when your Hamming problem is ‘I need to find a more efficient toothbrush’?