Category Archives: 1

Association taxes are collusion subsidies

Crossposted from world spirit sock puppet.

Under present norms, if Alice associates with Bob, and Bob is considered objectionable in some way, Alice can be blamed for her association, even if there is no sign she was complicit in Bob’s sin.

An interesting upshot is that as soon as you become visibly involved with someone, you are slightly invested in their social standing—when their social stock price rises and falls, yours also wavers.

And if you are automatically bought into every person you notably interact with, this changes your payoffs. You have reason to forward the social success of those you see, and to suppress their public scrutiny.

And so the social world is flooded with mild pressure toward collusion at the expense of the public. By the time I’m near enough to Bob’s side to see his sins, I am a shareholder in their not being mentioned.

And so the people best positioned for calling out vice are auto-bought into it on the way there. Even though the very point of this practice of guilt-by-association seems to be to empower the calling-out of vice—raining punishment on not just the offender but those who wouldn’t shun them. This might be overall worth it (including for reasons not mentioned in this simple model), but it seems worth noticing this countervailing effect.

Prediction: If consortment was less endorsement—if it were commonplace to spend time with your enemies—then it would be more commonplace to publicly report small wrongs.

Association taxes are collusion subsidies

Crossposted from world spirit sock puppet.

Under present norms, if Alice associates with Bob, and Bob is considered objectionable in some way, Alice can be blamed for her association, even if there is no sign she was complicit in Bob’s sin.

An interesting upshot is that as soon as you become visibly involved with someone, you are slightly invested in their social standing—when their social stock price rises and falls, yours also wavers.

And if you are automatically bought into every person you notably interact with, this changes your payoffs. You have reason to forward the social success of those you see, and to suppress their public scrutiny.

And so the social world is flooded with mild pressure toward collusion at the expense of the public. By the time I’m near enough to Bob’s side to see his sins, I am a shareholder in their not being mentioned.

And so the people best positioned for calling out vice are auto-bought into it on the way there. Even though the very point of this practice of guilt-by-association seems to be to empower the calling-out of vice—raining punishment on not just the offender but those who wouldn’t shun them. This might be overall worth it (including for reasons not mentioned in this simple model), but it seems worth noticing this countervailing effect.

Prediction: If consortment was less endorsement—if it were commonplace to spend time with your enemies—then it would be more commonplace to publicly report small wrongs.

Winning the power to lose

Crossposted from world spirit sock puppet.

Mental software updates

Crossposted from world spirit sock puppet.

Secondary forces of debt

Crossposted from world spirit sock puppet.

A general thing I hadn’t noticed about debts until lately:

  • Whenever Bob owes Alice, then Alice has reason to look after Bob, to the extent that increases the chance he satisfies the debt.
  • Yet at the same time, Bob has an incentive for Alice to disappear, insofar as it would relieve him.

These might be tiny incentives, and not overwhelm for instance Bob’s many reasons for not wanting Alice to disappear.

But the bigger the owing, the more relevant the incentives. When big enough, the former comes up as entities being “too big to fail”, and potentially rescued from destruction by those who would like them to repay or provide something expected of them in future. But the opposite must exist also: too big to succeed—where the abundance owed to you is so off-putting to provide that those responsible for it would rather disempower you.

And if both kinds of incentive are around in whisps whenever there is a debt, surely they often get big enough to matter, even before they become the main game.

For instance, if everyone around owes you a bit of money, I doubt anyone will murder you over it. But I wouldn’t be surprised if it motivated a bit more political disempowerment for you on the margin.

There is a lot of owing that doesn’t arise from formal debt, where these things also apply. If we both agree that I—as your friend—am obliged to help you get to the airport, you may hope that I have energy and fuel and am in a good mood. Whereas I may (regretfully) be relieved when your flight is canceled.

Money is an IOU from society for some stuff later, so having money is another kind of being owed. Perhaps this is part of the common resentment of wealth.

I tentatively take this as reason to avoid debt in all its forms more: it’s not clear that the incentives of alliance in one direction make up for the trouble of the incentives for enmity in the other. And especially so when they are considered together—if you are going to become more aligned with someone, better it be someone who is not simultaneously becoming misaligned with you. Even if such incentives never change your behavior, every person you are obligated to help for an hour on their project is a person for whom you might feel a dash of relief if their project falls apart. And that is not fun to have sitting around in relationships.

(Inpsired by reading The Debtor’s Revolt by Ben Hoffman lately, which may explicitly say this, but it’s hard to be sure because I didn’t follow it very well. Also perhaps inspired by a recent murder mystery spree, in which my intuitions have absorbed the heuristic that having something owed to you is a solid way to get murdered.)