Category Archives: 1

On using computers as brains and brains as computers

I visited the DC area recently and recorded a couple more podcasts with Robin Hanson while there:

Talking to Robin is pretty entertaining and intellectually invigorating, and I recommend it.

The rest of our very occasional podcast series:

Iterating hurt

A truish story with all names and many circumstances altered:

Alice and Bob were friends, but their friendship had seen some rough patches recently due to an ill-advised business experiment and some ensuing uncomfortable feelings. Today they were co-working, with the intent of mending whatever was broken through dedicated inattention. The two of them sat down in Alice’s kitchen. Bob took out paper, pens, and a loud bell. He picked up the bell and proceeded to pace back and forth across the room jangling it with the vigor of two arms and staring into space.

It turned out that Alice loved the sound of loudly jangling bells, which reminded her of the beautiful church she used to live next to. And she was working on her own general solution to coordination problems—a puzzle so fascinating that she could not possibly be distracted, even by the delightful bell song. So the noise caused Alice no suffering.

However, Alice reasoned that Bob had no way of knowing that she would not be harmed, and that he really should have expected that his bell-ringing would annoy her a lot in expectation. So she had little choice but to infer that Bob didn’t care about hurting her. And that did hurt.

Furthermore, she reasoned that Bob must be aware that she would be hurt by observing that he didn’t care about hurting her. So he should have anticipated not only some suffering in expectation from the bell, but also this second level of more certain suffering from observing Bob’s indifference. Knowing that he was happy to deal her even that much suffering was even worse. And furthermore he didn’t even care about this extra suffering!

On top of that, she reasoned, once there is enough common knowledge of enough certainty of enough suffering willingly inflicted, Bob can’t be doing this by accident. It becomes an intentional affront. A message of hatred, rather than an inadvertent sign of indifference.

She became extremely angry and marched out of the front door.

(Bob made a mental note that Alice really didn’t like bell sounds.)

Knowing that someone knowingly hurt you is hurtful. And knowing that someone knowingly hurt you by indirectly causing you to know that they knowingly hurt you is hurtful. And so on.

I suggest that social injury often has this character of being magnified iteratively by approaching common knowledge.

Perfectly legitimate offense doesn’t even need to stand on the ground at all. Suppose that I like being slapped in the face. Also, I know that you know this. But I also know that you don’t know that I know that you know that I like being slapped in the face. Then you slap me in the face. I’ve got to figure you are willingly harming me with your seeming desire to harm me, even if you don’t think I will actually mind the slap per se. Alice was reasonable to be upset, even though she liked the bell sound.

I expect something similar can happen at a group level. There is an action that hurts a small fraction of some group of people. Then doing it indicates that you are fine with a chance of hurting people from that group, which hurts the feelings of the whole group, and causes enmity with whatever groups you are saliently a member of. Then if people continue to do the action, the victim group takes it as an even larger sign of disrespect and at some point an intentional slight. Then even if the action ceases to hurt anybody on the object level, or is replaced altogether by things that are thematically similar but not object-level harmful, it has become a slight, and continues to hurt, because connotations are hard to erase. I don’t really know if this happens—I don’t keep up with current offense. More informed opinions welcome.

This theory predicts that actions would often be offensive in spite of probably not directly harming anyone on the object level. I think this does happen. I also guess that it leads to some confusion around whether other people are just pretending to be offended. (I also expect people sometimes are pretending to be offended, because often there are incentives to, and at least some people respond to incentives sometimes).

I also wonder if something like this explains why people jump on random insensitive statements that weakly suggest offensive views, even when there is no chance that the person holds the offensive view in question. If I really believed that someone thought I was good at drawing, but I also heard them accidentally momentarily imply to someone else that my drawings were rubbish, I would figure that they weren’t very interested in whether this might hurt me. Also that they might be trying to intentionally anger me. And people intentionally trying to anger me can be angering.

I posit that offense should almost always be out of proportion to the action that caused it. Hurtful actions automatically snowball into being more hurtful, and the offense of the victim is a response to the hurt accrued by the time the snowball lands.

On liking things about crushes

Sometimes I have had crushes on people, and then all kinds of miscellaneous characteristics they had seemed good. Not just their face or their sense of style or the exact way they pronounce my name. But also things that would usually be considered unattractive. For instance, if they are balding, I might suddenly find myself excited by sparse head stubble, when I had previously liked luxuriant hair. And then subsequently I would be more attracted to every other balding guy I met.

I think this is not just directly because the person having those characteristics makes the characteristics by association the most excellent characteristics a person could have. Though that is maybe part of it (your face reminds me of…you!)

I think it is also because I implicitly infer that the person in question likes those characteristics, and I expect people to like me more if I like the things they like. For instance, if they are grumpy and have crumpled clothes, I think I implicitly infer that they like people being grumpy and wearing crumpled clothes, and that if I favor those things too, it will help us be friends. And I can appreciate a pretty wide range of things, so I implicitly give attention to the ones that are helpful.

So I suppose that I must implicitly believe everyone likes almost all of their characteristics. Explicitly, I think this is unlikely to be true. Though I do expect people relate more to people who share their characteristics, whether or not they like the characteristics. So maybe that is what I’m implicitly going for.

All this leads me to think that that my brain is probably doing a milder version of the thing it does with crushes with respect to other people who I like in less extreme ways all the time. “Ooh—I guess you like being mildly irritated! I can do that too! Grr. Do you like me?” It is just only so strong as to be introspectively perceptible in the case of crushes. Which I guess matches the observation that people copy each other a lot.

I have long had the abstract impression that I should choose who I spend much time with carefully because company makes an alarmingly large difference to one’s own behavior. But the way that my brain updates on crushes makes that concern feel more viscerally real to me. Happily (not coincidentally) current company seems pretty good. Though unusual, so probably I don’t give things like religiosity and being athletic proper thought. These concerns are is not news, but a new angle from which to feel like it is actually a real problem and not just one of those problems that it would be virtuous to be troubled by.

Hiding misinformation in meanings

I

It is hard to spread misinformation, because information spreads too, and they eventually run into each other and explode.

If a person wants to lie then, they can be better off to make words correspond to different things for different people, so that even when people hear the information it sounds the same as the misinformation.

For instance, suppose you buy tea in Alphaland and sell it in Betaland. As a dishonest businessperson, you would like it if the people in Alphaland believed tea was cheaper that people in Betaland believed it was. However if there are two different verbal sentences kicking around about the price of tea, they will eventually run into each other, because sentences can spread fast.

A different solution is to corner the market for tea weighing devices in at least one nation. Then make them all give slightly biased readouts. Now tea costs the same amount per pound in the two places, but you just sell more pounds than you buy. The information and the misinformation both sound like “tea costs $10/lb”. Tea measuring devices cross the sea slower than words, so this might be more sustainable.

Relatedly, if you wanted to not have your children informed about Santa Claus, you might just call him something else—e.g. Joulupukki—in your home. If you want, you can tell them there is a probable faker called Santa Clause and it is a matter of controversy whether he is the real deal like Joulupukki. Because words refer to unusual things, the information—‘Santa Clause isn’t real’—sounds just like your misinformation.

This can really only work if people are sufficiently isolated that the differences in meanings don’t become obvious, but that sometimes happens.

II

I’m not much in favor of misinformation. But one time I was young and desperate and I did something like this.

From when I was a young teenager I was substantially in charge of raising my three younger brothers, and (because I was not a good necromancer) I had to keep the violence within certain limits.

First (I think) I tried to be nice. I sat down and talked to them about what had happened, and if someone had clearly been vicious, I sent him to his room or something. But it seemed that only punishing people who are clearly guilty leads to not-very-conscionable levels of violence to innocent children.

I pondered justice and mercy. I construed the situation game theoretically. I experimented with different rules and punishment regimes. The children bit themselves just to spite each other (I think).

I gave up on figuring out guilt, and tried just sending everyone to their room for every fight. They started fights just to see the innocent victim punished. They also destroyed parts of the house and its contents if they were annoyed about being sent to their rooms unjustifiedly, so sending people to their rooms was kind of costly.

I wondered whether children are oblivious to incentives, or just wisely refuse to negotiate with authorities, forcing the authorities to give up. But I couldn’t really give up, because I didn’t have any other options (I was a step ahead in the not negotiating, as the children might have realized if they had read Schelling).

This all took up a lot of the time that I wasn’t at school, if I recall. Every time I would sit down to read a book or something, I would be interrupted by shrieking. I really don’t like shrieking. At this point, I don’t even like the sound of joyful childish laughter, I think because I associate it with joyful childish unapologetic cruelty and hatred. But furthermore, I don’t like being interrupted every five minutes to have a big argument with some children. So I really didn’t like this situation.

My brothers were ‘meant to’ go to bed in the evening. If I started encouraging them to go to bed at about 10pm, that gave the four of us enough time to argue about whether they should or not for three hours before an adult came home and became angry about how the children weren’t in bed. At which point my brothers would go to bed, because the adults were bigger and more exhausted and more authoritative than me.

At some point I realized I had been thinking about things all wrong. All peace really required was for my brothers to believe that it was almost 1am. And my brothers’ beliefs about what time it was were almost entirely dependent on seven or so clocks. And clocks have little dials on the back of them that you can turn around to change where their hands are.

It was somewhat complicated, because there were a bunch of external signs about what time it was. For instance, school would end at 3pm or so. So it had to be 3.30 or so when the children returned home. After that I would gradually change all seven or so visible clocks in the house forward half an hour or an hour at a time, several times through the afternoon and evening. Then by about 8pm it would be past midnight, and the children would hurry off to bed before any adults came home. Then I would get hours (!!!) of solitude (!!!) and peace (!!!)

This was somewhat complicated by the TV schedule, which I said must have been printed for a state in a different time zone with somewhat different programming.

It was also complicated by me messing up one time, and my brother noticing that it was still light at midnight. But a conspiracy didn’t occur to him, and he dismissed it as ‘funny weather today’.

Ultimately the entire scheme was short lived, but only ended by my mother and stepfather objecting to it. My brothers didn’t suspect until I told them about it later.

So, that’s another example. I sometimes wonder if there is more of this kind of thing in the world.

Shame as low verbal justification alarm

What do you think feeling shame means?

You are scared that you might be ostracized from the group

But I feel shame about things that other people don’t even care about.

You are scared that you should be ostracized from the group.

That seems unrelated to the social realities. Why would evolution bother to equip me with a feeling for that?

Because you need to be able to justify yourself verbally. It is important that you think you should not be ostracized, so you can argue for it. Even if nobody shares your standards, if other people try to ostracize you for some stupid reason and you—for other reasons—believe that you really should be ostracized, then you are in trouble. You want to believe wholeheartedly that you are worthy of alliance. So if you don’t, an alarm bell goes off until you manage to justify yourself or sufficiently distance yourself from the activity that you couldn’t justify.

(From a discussion with John Salvatier)