Category Archives: 1

Where are the big questions?

There is no widely agreed upon list of the most important intellectual questions. Nor even a well-known attempted list, upon which people disagree. As far as I can tell there is hardly even such a list for any specific field. I don’t know of even a single person who has such a list. The closest things I know of are Hilbert’s list of important mathematical problems, published in 1900, a few less well knows lists by later mathematicians, some of Edge’s Question Center lists, and a recently compiled list by of problems in social sciences.

Perhaps you can find (and please send me) examples to prove there are such things, but my point remains that such lists are not common or popular. It seems that we hardly even discuss what the most important questions are. I don’t know off the top of my head what I think they are, even for the fields I am especially interested in. I could probably come up with a list if I thought about it, but it is surprising that I have not sufficiently done so already. I have even less idea how other people would answer. This seems strange. The idealistic intellectual’s supposed self-imposed quest is to work out these big important problems, or chip tiny bits off the sides of them. It seems it would be useful to keep in mind what we think these problems are.

I’m tired, so instead of compiling such a list, I’ll just give you one question. Why are such lists not more popular? I don’t know. But here are some ideas in no particular order:

  1. ‘Important questions’ is just too vague a category.
    This seems false; there is generally public agreement about which additions to human knowledge are significant advances. If it is too vague, it could be narrowed to either questions of practical importance or those with theoretical interestingness.
    .
  2. Questions’ are too vague an entity.
    How important a question is just depends on how abstract you make it, and questions abstracted too far are useless. ‘How can we make the universe perfect?’ is presumably the question of most practical importance, and is not interesting at all. I don’t think this is really a barrier though. I’d be surprised if our intuitive notion of what is an optimally abstracted question did not serve. Or we could just pick a rough level of abstraction and stick to it.
    .
  3. Nobody cares about intellectual progress on big ideas. Intellectuals are all about signaling their academic ability, and asking questions doesn’t do that.
    This seems false and immaterial. For someone to make a list it need not be that most people are motivated by intellectual progress on big ideas. Only a small fraction need be motivated. And they need not be motivated by intellectual progress on big ideas alone – there are other kinds of attention one could get from such an activity. A person could demonstrate confidence in his judgement and informedness, like having an opinion on the best wines or films can in other circles does. Knowing enough about enough things to write a decent list would be quite a feat I think. Many intellectuals write blogs, and I expect compiling such a list could get an amount and type of attention not unlike a period of blogging, even if the list was collected from the opinions others. I would expect some section of intellectuals to be motivated even if the majority are not.
    .
  4. Such a list would not actually be useful, since whoever had a say would use their answer to look good, or advertise a problem that they are already working on.
    This is arguably illustrated within some of the near-examples I listed. However it should be possible to get around this, for instance by each person having to nominate a number of questions, or by the authors being sensible to the effects on their credibility if they so blatantly self-promote.
    .
  5. Most intellectuals are already working on something, and prefer to think that it is one of the most important things. So they would be actively opposed in the same way that doctors are opposed to finding out and publicising which hospitals are least likely to kill you.
    This is supported by the observation that whenever you begin a new subject at college you are introduced with the assurance that anthropology for instance really is the bedrock upon which all other puny scientific pursuits are built. But if this is a force against scrutiny of importance, it is not so obviously so that it should have put off anyone from trying to make such a list.

Why do you think we don’t keep lists of the big questions?

Matching game

Have you have read the overview of this blog? If so, I would be pleased if you would tell me which of the following styles of thought you think closest to that manifested in it:

My novel opinions

I was inspired by Richard Chappell’s end of year summary, curious for a big picture view of what I blog about, and hungry for organization, so I made an overview of my blogged opinions since I moved to this address in July 09. It’s here and also permanently in the menu bar as ‘Opinions’.

Population ethics and personal identity

Chocolate cake with chocolate frosting topped ...

Photo: Misocrazy

It seems most people think creating a life is a morally neutral thing to do while destroying one is terrible. This is apparently because prior to being alive and contingent on not being born, you can’t want to be alive, and nobody exists to accrue benefits or costs. For those who agree with these explanations, here’s a thought experiment.

The surprise cake thought experiment

You are sleeping dreamlessly. Your friends are eating a most delicious cake. They consider waking you and giving you a slice, before you all go back to sleep. They know you really like waking up in the night to eat delicious cakes with them and will have no trouble getting back to sleep. They are about to wake you when they realize that if they don’t give you the cake you you will be unconscious and thus unable to want to join them, or be helped or harmed. So they finish it themselves. When you awake the next day and are told how they almost wasted their cake on you, are you pleased they did not?

If not, one explanation is that you are a temporally extended creature who was awake and had preferences in the past, and that these things mean you currently have preferences. You still can’t accrue benefits or costs unless you get a bit more conscious, but it usually seems the concern is just whether there is an identity to whom the benefits and costs will apply. As an added benefit, this position would allow you to approve of resuscitating people who have collapsed.

To agree with this requires a notion of personal identity other than ‘collection of person-moments which I choose to define as me’, unless you would find the discretionary boundaries of such collections morally relevant enough to make murder into nothing at all. This kind of personal identity seems needed to make unconscious people who previously existed significantly different from those who have never existed.

It seems very unlikely to me that people have such identities. Nor do I see how it should matter if they did, but that’s another story. Perhaps those of you who think I should better defend my views on population ethics could tell me why I should change my mind on personal identity. These may or may not help.

The Unpresumptuous Philosopher

Nick Bostrom showed that either position in Extreme Sleeping Beauty seems absurd, then gave a third option. I argued that his third option seems worse than either of the original pair. If I am right there that  the  case  for Bayesian  conditioning without updating on  evidence  fails, we have  a  choice  of  disregarding  Bayesian  conditioning in at least some situations,  or  distrusting the aversion to extreme updates as in Extreme Sleeping Beauty. The latter seems the necessary choice, given the huge disparity in evidence supporting Bayesian conditioning and that supporting these particular intuitions about large updates and strong beliefs.

Notice that both the Halfer and Thirder positions on Extreme Sleeping Beauty have very similar problems. They are seemingly opposed by the same intuitions against extreme certainty in situations where we don’t feel certain, and extreme updates in situations where we hardly feel we have any evidence. Either before or after discovering you are in the first waking, you must be very sure of how the coin came up. And between ignorance of the day and knowledge, you must change your mind drastically. If we must choose one of these positions then, it is not clear which is preferable on these grounds alone.

Now notice that the Thirder position in Extreme Sleeping Beauty is virtually identical to SIA and consequently the Presumptuous Philosopher’s position (as Nick explains, p64). From Anthropic Bias:

 

The Presumptuous Philosopher

39It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very, very big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion, trillion observers in the cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and there are a trillion, trillion, trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations are indifferent between these two theories. Physicists are preparing a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: “Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1 (whereupon the philosopher […] appeals to SIA)!”

The Presumptuous Philosopher is like the Extreme Sleeping Beauty Thirder because they are both in one of two possible worlds with a known probability of existing, one of which has a much larger population than the other. They are both wondering which of these worlds they are in.

Is the Presumptuous Philosopher really so presumptuous? Analogous to the Extreme Sleeping Beauty Halfer then shall be the Unpresumptuous Philosopher. When the Unpresumptuous Philosopher  learns  there  are  a  trillion  times  as many  observers  in T2  she  remains  cautiously unmoved. However, when the physicists later discover where in the cosmos our planet is under  both  theories,  the  Unpresumptuous  Philosopher  becomes  virtually  certain  that  the sparsely populated T1 is correct while the Presumptuous Philosopher hops back on the fence.

The Presumptuous Philosopher is often chided for being sure the universe is infinite, given there is some chance of an infinite universe existing. It should be noted that this is only as long as he cannot restrict his possible locations in it to any finite region. The Unpresumptuous Philosopher is uncertain under such circumstances. However she believes with probability one that we are in a finite world if she knows her location is within any finite region. For instance if she knows the age  of  her spatially finite universe  she  is  certain  that  it will  not  continue  for  infinitely  long. Here her presumptuous friend is quite unsure.

Statue of an unknown Cynic philosopher from th...

This philosopher has a nice perch now, but where will he go if evidence moves him? Photo: Yair Haklai

It seems to me that as the two positions on Extreme Sleeping Beauty are as unintuitive as each other, the two philosophers seem as presumptuous as each other. The accusation of inducing a large probability shift and encouraging ridiculous certainty is hardly an argument that can be used against the SIA-Thirder-Presumptuous Philosopher position in favor of the SSA-Halfer-Unpresumptuous Philosopher side. Since the Presumptuous Philosopher is usually considered the big argument against SIA, and not considered an argument against SSA at all, an update in favor of SIA is in order.