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Natural cultural relativists?

When given the same ability to punish anyone, cooperative people want to punish members of groups they identify with more than they do outsiders, while less cooperative people want to punish outsiders more. From the Journal of Evolution and Human Behavior:

One of the most critical features of human society is the pervasiveness of cooperation in social and economic exchanges. Moreover, social scientists have found overwhelming evidence that such cooperative behavior is likely to be directed toward in-group members. We propose that the group-based nature of cooperation includes punishment behavior. Punishment behavior is used to maintain cooperation within systems of social exchange and, thus, is directed towards members of an exchange system. Because social exchanges often take place within groups, we predict that punishment behavior is used to maintain cooperation in the punisher’s group. Specifically, punishment behavior is directed toward in-group members who are found to be noncooperators. To examine this, we conducted a gift-giving game experiment with third-party punishment. The results of the experiment (N=90) support the following hypothesis: Participants who are cooperative in a gift-giving game punish noncooperative in-group members more severely than they punish noncooperative out-group members.

..[W]e predict that … punishment behavior is directed toward in-group members who are found to be noncooperators. To examine this, we conducted a gift-giving game experiment with third-party punishment. The results of the experiment (N=90) support the following hypothesis: Participants who are cooperative in a gift-giving game punish noncooperative in-group members more severely than they punish noncooperative out-group members.

The researchers’ conclusion is that punishment is just an extension of cooperation, and so applies in the same areas. They were not expecting, and haven’t got a good explanation for, uncooperative people’s interest in specifically punishing outsiders.

This provides a potential explanation for something I was wondering about. Middle class people often seem to talk about poor people and people from other cultures in terms of their actions being caused by bad external influences, in contrast to the language of free will and responsibility for their own kind. Discussion of Aboriginals in Australia regularly exemplifies this. e.g. SMH:

More than half the Aboriginal male inmates in prison for violent crimes are suffering from post traumatic stress disorder, an academic says.

And without effective intervention, the “stressors” for the disorder will be passed on to other generations, perpetuating the cycles of crime.

Dr Caroline Atkinson said most violent inmates had suffered from some form of family violence, alcohol and drug use, as well as profound grief and loss…

“It was a confronting experience being inside a cell with someone who has committed murder, but I quickly realised they are the ones with the answers and they had such amazing insight,” she said.

This is quite unlike news coverage I have seen of middle class white murderers. When we see faults as caused by external factors rather than free will or personal error, we aren’t motivated to punish. Is the common practice of coolly blaming circumstance when we talk about situations like violence in Aboriginal communities because the good, cooperative people who write about these things don’t identify with the groups they are talking about?

On a side note, is our ‘widening moral circle’ linked to greater desire to reform other cultures?

What is hope?

At first it seems like a mixture of desire and belief in a possibility. It’s not just desire because you can ‘have your hopes too high’, though the hoped for outcome is well worthy of desire, or ‘abandon hope’ when something reaches some level of unlikelihood. But hope is also not linked to a particular level of chance. It implies uncertainty about the outcome, but nothing beyond that.

Is it a mixture of significant uncertainty and a valuable outcome then? No, you can consider something plausible and wonderful, but not worth hoping for. Sometimes it is worse to hope for the most marvelous things. No matter how likely, folks ‘don’t want to get their hopes up’ or ‘can’t bear to hope’ .

So there is apparently a cost to hoping. Hopes can bring you unhappiness if they fail, while another possibility with similar chances and desirability which was not hoped for would cause no distress. So hope is to do with something other than value or likelihood.

A hope sounds like a goal which you can’t necessarily influence then. Failing in a goal is worse than failing in something you did not intend to achieve. A hope or a goal seems to be particular point in outcome space where you will be extra happy if it is reached or surpassed and extra unhappy otherwise. We seem to choose goals according to a trade-off of ease and desirability, which is reminiscent of our seemingly choosing hopes according to likelihood and desirability. Unlike hopes though, we pretty much always try harder for goals when the potential gains are big. This probably makes sense; trying harder at a goal increases the likelihood of success, whereas hoping more does not, yet still gives you the larger misery of failure.

Why hope at all then? Why not just have smooth utility functions? Goals help direct actions, which is extremely handy. Hopes seem to be outcomes you cheer for from the sidelines. Is this useful at all? Is it just a side effect of having goals? Is it so we can show others what would be our goals if we had the power? In which case should we expect declared hopes to be less honest than declared goals? Why are hopes so ubiquitous?

Generous people cross the street before the beggar

Robert Wiblin points to a study showing that the most generous people are the most keen to avoid situations where they will be generous, even though the people they would have helped will go without.

We conduct an experiment to demonstrate the importance of sorting in the context of social preferences. When individuals are constrained to play a dictator game, 74% of the subjects share. But when subjects are allowed to avoid the situation altogether, less than one third share. This reversal of proportions illustrates that the influence of sorting limits the generalizability of experimental findings that do not allow sorting. Moreover, institutions designed to entice pro-social behavior may induce adverse selection. We find that increased payoffs prevent foremost those subjects from opting out who share the least initially. Thus the impact of social preferences remains much lower than in a mandatory dictator game, even if sharing is subsidized by higher payoffs…

A big example of generosity inducing institutions causing adverse selection is market transactions with poor people.

For some reason we hold those who trade with another party responsible for that party’s welfare. We blame a company for not providing its workers with more, but don’t blame other companies for lack of charity to the same workers. This means that you can avoid responsibility to be generous by not trading with poor people.

Many consumers feel that if they are going to trade with poor people they should buy fair trade or thoroughly research the supplier’s niceness. However they don’t have the money or time for those, so instead just avoid buying from poor people. Only the less ethical remain to contribute to the purses of the poor.

Probably the kindest girl in my high school said to me once that she didn’t want a job where she would get rich because there are so many poor people in the world. I said that she should be rich and give the money to the poor people then. Nobody was wowed by this idea. I suspect something similar happens often with people making business and employment decisions. Those who have qualms about a line of business such as trade with poor people tend not to go into that, but opt for something guilt free already, while the less concerned do the jobs where compassion might help.

Trust in the adoration of strangers

Attractive people are more trusting when they think they can be seen:

Here, we tested the effects of cues of observation on trusting behavior in a two-player Trust game and the extent to which these effects are qualified by participants’ own attractiveness. Although explicit cues of being observed (i.e., when participants were informed that the other player would see their face) tended to increase trusting behavior, this effect was qualified by the participants’ other-rated attractiveness (estimated from third-party ratings of face photographs). Participants’ own physical attractiveness was positively correlated with the extent to which they trusted others more when they believed they could be seen than when they believed they could not be seen. This interaction between cues of observation and own attractiveness suggests context dependence of trusting behavior that is sensitive to whether and how others react to one’s physical appearance.

Probably rightly so. It’s interesting that people do not get used to the average level of good treatment expected for their attractiveness, but are sensitive to the difference in treatment when visible and when not. Is it inbuilt that we should expect some difference there, or is it just very noticeable?

I wonder whether widespread beauty enhancement increases overall trust in society, and enhances productivity accordingly, or whether favorable treatment and returned trust both adapt to relative position. Does advertising suggesting that the world is chock full of model material decrease trust between real people?

Everyone else prefers laws to values

How do you tell what a superhuman AI's values are? ( picture: ittybittiesforyou - see bottom)

How do you tell what a superhuman AI's values are? ( picture: ittybittiesforyou - see bottom)

Robin Hanson says that it is more important to have laws than shared values. I agree with him when ‘shared values’ means that shared indexical values remain about different people, e.g. If you and I share a high value of orgasms, you value you having orgasms and I value me having orgasms. Unless we are dating it’s all the same to me if you prefer croquet to orgasms. I think the singularitarians aren’t talking about this though. They want to share values in such a way that AI wants them to have orgasms. In principle this would be far better than having different values and trading. Compare gains from trading with the world economy to gains from the world economy’s most heartfelt wish being to please you. However I think that laws will get far more attention than values overall in arranging for an agreeable robot transition, and rightly so. Let me explain, then show you how this is similar to some more familiar situations.

Greater intelligences are unpredictable

If you know exactly what a creature will do in any given situation before it does it, you are at least as smart as it (if we don’t include it’s physical power as intelligence). Greater intelligences are inherently unpredictable. If you know the intelligence is trying to do, then you know what kind of outcome to expect, but guessing how it will get there is harder. This should be less so for lesser intelligences, and more so for more different intelligences. I will have less trouble guessing what a ten year old will do in chess against me than a grand master, though I can guess the outcome in both cases. If I play someone with a significantly different way of thinking about the game they may also be hard to guess.

Unpredictability is dangerous

This unpredictability is a big part of the fear of a superhuman AI. If you don’t know what path an intelligence will take to the goal you set it, you don’t know whether it will affect other things that you care about. This problem is most vividly illustrated by the much discussed case where the AI in question is suddenly very many orders of magnitude smarter than a human. Imagine we initially gave it only a subset of our values, such as our yearning to figure out whether P = NP, and we assume that it won’t influence anything outside its box. It might determine that the easiest way to do this is to contact outside help, build powerful weapons, take more resources by force, and put them toward more computing power. Because we weren’t expecting it to consider this option, we haven’t told it about our other values that are relevant to this strategy, such as the popular penchant for being alive.

I don’t find this type of scenario likely, but others do, and the problem could arise at a lesser scale with weaker AI. It’s a bit like the problem that every genie owner in fiction has faced. There are two solutions. One is to inform the AI about all of human values, so it doesn’t matter how wide it’s influence is. The other is to restrict its actions. SIAI interest seems to be in giving the AI human values (whatever that means), then inevitably surrendering control to it. If the AI will inevitably likely be so much smarter than humans that it will control everything fovever almost immediately, I agree that values are probably the thing to focus on. But consider the case where AI improves fast but by increments, and no single agent becomes more powerful than all of human society for a long time.

Unpredictability also makes it hard to use values to protect from unpredictability

When trying to avoid the dangers of unpredictability, the same unpredictability causes another problem for using values as a means of control. If you don’t know what an entity will do with given values, it is hard to assess whether it actually has those values. It is much easier to assess whether it is following simpler rules. This seems likely to be the basis for human love of deontological ethics and laws. Utilitarians may get better results in principle, but from the perspective of anyone else it’s not obvious whether they are pushing you in front of a train for the greater good or specifically for the personal bad. You would have to do all the calculations yourself and trust their information. You also can’t rely on them to behave in any particular way so that you can plan around them, unless you make deals with them, which is basically paying them to follow rules, so is more evidence for my point.

‘We’ cannot make the AI’s values safe.

I expect the first of these things to be a particular problem with greater than human intelligences. It might be better in principle if an AI follows your values, but you have little way to tell whether it is. Nearly everyone must trust the judgement, goodness and competency of whoever created a given AI, be it a person or another AI. I suspect this gets overlooked somewhat because safety is thought of in terms of what to do when *we* are building the AI. This is the same problem people often have thinking about government. They underestimate the usefulness of transparency there because they think of the government as ‘we’. ‘We should redistribute wealth’ may seem unproblematic, whereas ‘I should allow an organization I barely know anything about to take my money on the vague understanding that they will do something good with it’ does not. For people to trust AIs the AIs should have simple enough promised behavior that people using them can verify that they are likely doing what they are meant to.

This problem gets worse the less predictable the agents are to you. Humans seem to naturally find rules more important for more powerful people and consequences more important for less powerful people. Our world also contains some greater than human intelligences already: organizations. They have similar problems to powerful AI. We ask them to do something like ‘cheaply make red paint’ and often eventually realize their clever ways to do this harm other values, such as our regard for clean water. The organization doesn’t care much about this because we’ve only paid it to follow one of our values while letting it go to work on bits of the world where we have other values. Organizations claim to have values, but who can tell if they follow them?

To control organizations we restrict them with laws. It’s hard enough to figure out whether a given company did or didn’t give proper toilet breaks to its employees. It’s virtually impossible to work out whether their decisions on toilet breaks are as close to optimal according some popularly agreed set of values.

It may seem this is because values are just harder to influence, but this is not obvious. Entities follow rules because of the incentives in place rather than because they are naturally inclined to respect simple constraints. We could similarly incentivise organizations to be utilitarian if we wanted. We just couldn’t assess whether they were doing it. Here we find rules more useful and values less for these greater than human intelligences than we do for humans.

We judge and trust friends and associates according to what we perceive to be their values. We drop a romantic partner because they don’t seem to love us enough even if they have fulfilled their romantic duties. But most of us will not be put off using a product because we think the company doesn’t have the right attitude, though we support harsh legal punishments for breaking rules. Entities just a bit superhuman are too hard to control with values.

You might point out here that values are not usually programmed specifically in organizations, whereas in AI they are. However this is not a huge difference from the perspective of everyone who didn’t program the AI. To the programmer, giving an AI all of human values may be the best method of avoiding assault on them. So if the first AI is tremendously powerful, so nobody but the programmer gets a look in, values may matter most. If the rest of humanity still has a say, as I think they will, rules will be more important.